This paper speci es a general set of conditions under which the impacts of a policy can be identi ed using data generated under a di erent policyregime. We show that some of the policy impacts can be identi ed under relatively weak conditions on the data and structure of a model. Based on the identi cation result we develop estimators of policy impacts. We discuss a nonparametric method to implement the estimation but also discuss semiparametric methods in order to reduce the conditioning dimension. We t h e n p r o vide an empirical example of the impact of tuition subsidies using the ideas. While the framework used in this paper is fairly narrow, we believe this approach can be applied to a broad set of problems.
The standard formal econometric approach to estimation of a policy impact uses two stages. First a structural" model is estimated, and second, these estimates are used to simulate the policy counter-factual. Sometimes the structural model takes the form of a regression model, and in other cases the model is speci ed from rst principles of a behavioral model. In both cases parameters of a model are estimated rst and then the estimate of a target parameter is constructed using these estimates.
Our approach here is to consider estimation of the policy impact directly rather than in two stages. When we have the limited objective of obtaining estimates of policy impacts we show that we can sometimes sidestep the problem of estimating the full behavioral models or even a regression model. We can still obtain consistent estimates of the policy impacts as captured by the parameters we s p e c i f y .
When the conditions justifying our approach are applicable, it has three bene ts over the standard structural approach. First, there are examples in which the full model is not identi ed, but the policy impact can be identi ed. In these cases the standard approach can not be carried out, but our approach may be applicable. For example, semiparametric identi cation of key parameters in the classic selection model is often achieved by identi cation at in nity" making use of the subset of data where the probability of a particular event is close to 0 and 1. 1 If the support of the data is limited so that the probability is never close to the extremes, then the parameters of the model are not identi ed without strong typically parametric restrictions on the distribution of the unobservables. The traditional two step policy analysis will not work without 1 See Chamberlain 1986 , Heckman 1990 , Heckman and Honore 1990 , or Angrist and Imbens 1991 . Taber 2000 uses a similar strategy to show identi cation in discrete choice dynamic programming models. 2 Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd 1998 and Heckman Ichimura and Todd 1997 , 1998 demonstrate that in practice these support conditions are very important. a parametric distributional assumption in that case. We show that identi cation of the full joint distribution of the error terms is unnecessary for identifying the policy impact measure we d e n e below a n d t h us our approach a voids the identi cation at in nity" problem. Related to this point is that even when all aspects of the rst stage model are formally identi ed, using estimates of them may lead to inaccurate estimates of policy impact relative to ours if the estimation of those parameters can be done only inaccurately.
Second, as we do not require speci cation of the rst stage model our approach is less prone to misspeci cation problems. In particular, often the two step approach relies on the speci cation of the additive error terms or parametric speci cation of the error distribution. Our approach does not rely on such speci cation.
Third, by the nature of two step procedures, the rst stage estimation is carried out without regard to the second stage. Thus when the rst stage is misspeci ed, the parameters that are tuned to approximate the rst stage equation may not beadequate to approximate the policy impact measure in the second stage. The problem is essentially that the loss function used to estimate the parameters in the rst stage is unrelated to the policy experiment for which the estimates will be used. By directly estimating the policy e ect we a void this problem by focusing on the variation of data that is directly linked to the policy impact.
In addition this approach shares with the structural approach a n a d v antage over instrumental variables" or natural experiment" methods of being explicit about the policy and some aspects of the behavioral model underlying the estimation. The emphasis in the natural experiment" literature is typically on nding exogenous variation. However, exactly how v ariation is linked to the policy under consideration is rarely made precise. We provide a framework to make this link. Making this link forces the empiricist to be explicit about which v ariation in the data corresponds to a policy equivalent v ariation. 3 Finding a policy equivalent v ariation typically requires stronger assumptions than in the instrumental variable case, but weaker assumptions than for full scale structural estimation. We view our approach a s a h ybrid between the two. This relates to the debate over Instrumental Variable estimation of treatment e ect models.
rameter because it typically does not answer an economically interesting question. Our approach avoids this criticism by estimating a pre-speci ed policy counter-factual. However, as we shall discuss, this type of reduced form approach is not always applicable. Clari cation of the conditions under which we can and cannot identify a policy impact is the primary goal of this paper.
Our idea is an extension of the classic idea of making use of historical variation that corresponds to the policy under consideration. When there is such exogenous variation in the data, it may b e used to identify the policy impact, but when there is no corresponding historical variation then there is di culty using this approach. Marschak 1953 provides an example of a monopolistic rm trying to maximize pro t. In his example, an output level correspond to a policy and outcome is pro t. By randomly experimenting with di erent l e v els of output and tabulating the results, the rm would know the pro t level that correspond to a particular output level without knowledge of any of the structural parameters. If we do not have data which correspond to certain level of outputs, then the pro t function at those points won't be observed. The simple example makes it clear that when there is a variation in the data that correspond to a policy under consideration one would know the impact of a policy but that when we don't have the corresponding historical variation we do not.
Another limitation of the approach is that when there is a change in some parameters then the reduced form relationship examined will in general change and thus the approach r e q u i r e s v ariation under the new regime. 5 Marschak 1953 discusses this problem using a government contemplating imposing a tax on the demand for the monopolist's output. When the government c hanges the tax rate, the reduced form relationship of pro t and output changes and thus the government w ould not be able to evaluate the impact of a change of the tax rate on the monopolist's pro t by studying the reduced form relationship observed in the past. In this sense the reduced form analysis seems applicable for ex-post policy analysis but not for ex-ante policy analysis. Marschak 1953 points out that by making use of an economic model of the demand function and the speci cation of how it relates to tax and the pro t function one can resolve this di culty by estimating the demand function. In terms of the discussion above, his is a two step approach; the rst step is the estimation of the demand function and the second step is to combine it with an economic model of demand that the demand only depends on tax through price to estimate the pro t function 5 See Hurwicz 1950 , Marschak 1953 , and Lucas 1976 under new regime. The analysis provides an example of a possibility of substituting economic theory in place of lack o f d a t a .
It is important not to interpret the classic work on this subject as implying that estimation of all of the parameters of a structural model is necessary for predicting the e ects of a new type of policy that has not been enacted in the past.
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By making use of some aspects of a behavioral model one can exploit other types of variation in the data to mimic the e ects of a policy change. Sims 1982 ment i o n s t h a t t h i s m a y be possible with a change in the money stock. In our empirical work, we consider the example of a tuition subsidy. Even if a tuition subsidy has never been enacted before, if we are willing to assume that the tuition faced by individuals varies exogenously and that the tuition subsidy operates only by lowering the net tuition paid, then one can estimate its e ect through reduced form nonparameteric regression. Knowing the e ect of tuition on outcomes allows one to infer the e ect of a tuition subsidy on outcomes without knowledge of the structural parameters of the model. However, we still need to impose some structure on the problem, namely that tuition subsidies operate only by lowering net tuition. Another example is taxes and labor supply. In a partial equilibrium setting workers will respond to changes in taxes in the same way they respond to changes in wages, so after invoking some structural assumptions one can use other types of variation in wages to estimate the e ects of taxes on labor supply.
Marschak observes that one can substitute lack of historical variation in the data with economic modeling in the structural approach. We exploit this observation in a more reduced form approach and specify the conditions under which the e ects of a particular policy can be identi ed directly. This paper focuses on the program evaluation model with two alternative choices, but the basic principle can be extended to more general contexts.
In section 2 we present our framework and section 3 establishes conditions under which policy e ects can beidenti ed. Section 4 describes the relationship between our approach and results available in the literature, and section 5 presents an empirical example. Section 6 concludes.
6 See Heckman 1999b for discussion of much of this previous literature.
Basic model and parameters of interest
There are three basic elements in our model: choice variables, outcome variables, and a policy under consideration. In this paper we consider a case in which the choice variable is binary and the outcome depends on the choice. We index the policy by which w e assume to lie in a space we call policyspace . The choice variable under policy is denoted by the random function D Z; w h i c h t a k es values 0 and 1, where Z is an observable random vector. Y 1 Z and Y 0 Z denote outcomes that correspond to choice D Z; = 1 and 0, respectively without reference to .
7 An important assumption we h a ve made is that the outcome distribution of Y 0 and Y 1 is not altered by the introduction of the new policy. 8 We do not consider policies that change treatment intensity. Nor do we consider the general equilibrium e ects of the policychange. 9 Heckman, Lochner, and Taber 1998 show that ignoring these e ects may be disastrous for some national programs. However, for local programs there is no reason to believe this assumption will be particularly problematic. We use the following notational convention throughout the rest of this paper. If HZ is 7 Many of the results will make use of exclusion restrictions: elements that in uence choice but not outcomes. However, to simplify the notation we write the outcome variables as a function of the whole vector Z. This notation includes cases where some elements of Z do not a ect outcomes. 8 We usually condition on Z but when we d o n o t , w e assume that the relevant Z distribution is the one under the old policy or it is not altered by a new policy. 9 For these cases see Smith 1997 and Heckman 1997 . General equilibrium e ects are considered by H e c kman, Lochner, and Taber 1998 where changing enrollment in the program may c hange the value of the program through equilibrium e ects. 10 so that jz; 0 ; j j c z; 0 ; j. This observation highlights the distinction between the two parameters. The mean treatment policyembodies the notion of extensiveness of the impact measured by P r fDz; 0 6 = Dz;g, but the conditional policy e ect is the measure that isolates the intensiveness of the impact once the choice is a ected. Ideally we w ould want to identify both the extensive and intensive impacts. Identi cation of parameter z; 0 ; c a n b e a c hieved under weaker conditions than those for c z; 0 ; . The intensity measure c z; 0 ; described above is related to the local average treatment e ect LATE of Imbens and Angrist 1994. They de ne LATE as the expected treatment e ect for individuals who are in uenced to change treatment status by a c hange in the value of a particular conditioning variable, which they refer to as an instrumental variable. Our parameter is the expected treatment e ect for individuals who are in uenced to change treatment status 11 And similarly, Pr fDz; = 1 g = P r fDZ; = 1 j Z = zg :
12 It is a version of the policy e ect in Heckman 1997 that conditions on Z.
by a change in a particular pre-speci ed policy. By separating the two explicitly, we provide a framework to discuss identi cation and measurement of policy impacts.
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The next two marginal treatment e ect" parameters we consider are normalized limits of the parameters z; 0 ; and c z; 0 ; , and can beconsidered only for that is de ned on a policy space with a notion of closeness". These parameters correspond to those discussed in the literature including studies by Bjorkland and Mo tt 1987 , Heckman and Smith 1997 . The nice aspect of these parameters is that with continuous data and policies they will be identi ed under weak support conditions.
To t h i s p o i n t w e h a ve not put any structure on , so the value of has no content u n to itself except as an index to a policy option. In thinking about marginal treatment e e c t s w e specialize to be a nite dimensional vector of real valued functions. For example if the government considered a tuition subsidy, could index the extent of the subsidy. In this case can be identi ed with the weakly positive real line. Suppose instead it considered a tuition subsidy with means testing, then a policy may b e r e p r e s e n ted by t wo n umbers = 1 ; 2 , where the amount of tuition subsidy is denoted by 1 and the maximum eligible parental income by 2 . In this case can beidenti ed with the two dimensional weakly positive real plane. If the amount of the subsidy depends on parental income then can be identi ed with a space of real valued functions.
We de ne a marginal treatment e ect as the impact of an in nitesimal change in the extent of intervention starting at and will consider two types. Let 0 bea real numberand let 0 = + for some element in . Letting` 0' denote approaches 0 from above, one concept is the limit of the conditional mean impact on the switchers when policy shifts marginally in direction, m c z;; lim 0 c z; 0 ; :
The other concept is the normalized limit of the mean impact when policyshifts marginally in direction, m z;; lim 0 z; 0 ; : 13 The distinction between an instrumental variable and a policy is important. The de nition of the LATE parameter depends on the data so that by de nition it will be identi ed. Since our parameter depends on a prespeci ed policy it is not necessarily identi ed. Angrist and Krueger 1992 provides a useful example for demonstrating the di erence between policy parameters and instrumental variables. Compulsory schooling laws are a policy that one can consider. However, the source of variation used for identi cation comes from variation in quarter of birth rather than schooling laws. While they are related, they are not identical.
For example if = e j where e j has 0 in all but the jth element and 1 as the jth element then since z; 0 ; = E Y z; 0 , Y z; ; m z;e j ; = @E Y z; @ j :
We note that the concept of m c z;; can bede ned more generally than the concept of the directional limit utilized here but that the concept of m z;; depends crucially on the concept of the directional limit as we make use of the normalizing number in an essential way.
As we observed, in general, where is a real number representing costs of choosing 1 over 0, Z and U denote observable and unobservable random variables that a ect the choice and study the parameter @EfY z;g @ : Aakvik, Heckman and consider a related parameter they call local IV. In the same sense that m c z;; is a limit form of c z; 0 ; , their parameter is a limit form of LATE. They show that in a latent v ariable framework this parameter can be interpreted as the value of the treatment conditional on being indi erent b e t ween entering the program. Taber 1999 estimates a version of this parameter. These parameters have two nice features. The rst is that, as the de nition makes clear, they can be approximated by z; 0 ; and c z; 0 ; where 0 is de ned by a small value of . The other nice feature is that, as we will show below, when the support Z is continuous, the parameters will be identi ed under weaker support conditions than those for z; 0 ; and c z; 0 ; . are not necessary for our purpose. Identi cation of the policye ects comes directly from these results.
Let Z bethe support of Z. We want to identify the choice behavior under a new policy 0 , DZ; 0 , using the observations about choices made under old policy, DZ;. The following set plays the key role for this purpose:
Dz; 0 ; = z 2 Z : P r fDz; 0 = Dz ; g = 1 :
For any point i n t h i s s e t , z 2 D z; 0 ; , the observed choice behavior Dz ; mimics the choice behavior under the new policy, Dz; 0 . Thus if we could condition on elements of this set we could identify the choice behavior under the new policy. Being able to condition on this set requires essentially two t ypes of conditions. First, we n e e d to be able to determine the values of z for which Dz; 0 = Dz ; . This will typically require some type of structural" assumption. Second, these values of z must becontained within the support of Z. In general, without any understanding of the relationship between z and , the set Dz; 0 ; i s not known. However we s h o w via examples below, that by exploiting some aspects of a behavioral model, in some cases we can identify the elements in this set. The notation we use in the bulk of the paper hides an important aspect of a problem involved in the statement a b o ve. We use more complete notation just for a few paragraphs below to explain the assumption needed more explicitly. Implicit in the expression PrfDz; 0 = Dz ; g is the assumption that the concept of probability is well de ned for two di erent points z and z . In particular, this requires that the stochastic element that drives the choice variable be independent from at least the part of Z that makes the equality holds. To express this more explicitly, let where ! expresses the stochastic element that drives the participation decision and z is the part of z that makes the equality holds. In order for this expression to make sense, Z and ! need to beindependent g i v enZ.
For convenience, we c a l l Z a policy-equivalent v ariation givenZ" or a policy equivalent variation" when andZ are evident o r n o t necessary to be made explicit in a discussion and ! unobserved variation in the choice variable". We assume Assumption 1 A p olicy equivalent variation and the unobserved variation in choice variable are independent given some conditioning variables under two policies and 0 .
The variables that correspond to the policy equivalent variation depends on the behavioral model assumed and Assumption 1 needs to be evaluated for each application.
For example in the empirical work we consider below, is the current tuition subsidy level and 0 is the contemplated tuition subsidy level. We assume a behavioral model in which college attendance depends only on net tuition so that individual choice depends only on z , , w h e r e z is a level of tuition faced before the subsidy. It is conceivable that an individual's behavior could be di erent for di erent c o m bination of z and even if z , is the same but this is the structural" assumption we are going to maintain and exploit. In addition to this assumption which de nes the policy equivalent v ariation, we need to maintain Assumption 1. In our example, tuition is measured by t h e a verage tuition of 2 year colleges of the state in which the individual lived at age 17. We need to assume that this variable and the unobserved variation in choice variable are independent given some conditioning variables. Because we expect the Z variable to be correlated with some state characteristics which also can be correlated with the individual characteristics, we need to condition on certain variables such as race and parental education level.
We next consider identi cation of the distribution of Y 1 z g i v en Dz; 0 = 1 and identi cation of the distribution of Y 0 z g i v en Dz; 0 = 0 . As we just discussed we simulate a decision under new policy, Dz; 0 , by examining the choice made under the old policy by individuals with characteristic z , Dz ; . Note that the corresponding outcome Y 1 z and Y 0 z need to match Y 1 z and Y 0 z, respectively. Thus the key assumption of the identi cation result is based on the following sets: Z 0 z; = fz 2 Z : P r fY 0 z = Y 0 z jDz ; = 0 g = 1 g ; Z 1 z; = fz 2 Z : P r fY 1 z = Y 1 z jDz ; = 1 g = 1 g :
Typically the assumption holds when some exclusion restrictions hold. In the tuition subsidy example, if tuition z does not enter directly into the outcome equation, the condition holds.
More generally, while it may bepossible to avoid them with some parametric speci cations, for general nonparametric models exclusion restrictions will be required to satisfy these conditions. Using the intersection of these sets with Dz; 0 ; , we can identify the distribution of Y z; 0 in a manner similar to PrDz; 0 = 1 a b o ve. In particular, for any z 2 Z , i f w e can nd a value z 2 D z; 0 ; that is contained in Z 0 z;, and Z 1 z;, then the distribution of Y z; 0 i s t h e same as the distribution of Y z ; . To see this note that for any z 2 Dz; 0 ; Z 0 z; Z 1 z;, PrY z; 0 y = P r Y 0 z y j Dz; 0 = 0 PrDz; 0 = 0 + P r Y 1 z y j Dz; 0 = 1 PrDz; 0 = 1 = P r Y 0 z y j Dz ; = 0 P r Dz ; = 0 + P r Y 1 z y j Dz ; = 1 PrDz ; = 1 = P r Y 0 z y j Dz ; = 0 PrDz ; = 0 + P r Y 1 z y j Dz ; = 1 PrDz ; = 1 = P r Y z ; y :
Thus conditioning on z allows us to identify the distribution of Y z; 0 . Once again this conditioning requires boththat Dz; 0 ; Z 0 z; Z 1 z; is known and that it is nonempty involving both structural" and support" conditions.
We n o w formalize this idea. From the theorem we k n o w that z; 0 ; is identi ed under Assumption 2. However these assumptions are not su cient for identi cation of the denominator. All we can hope to identify about the joint distribution of Dz; 0 ; D z; conditional on Z = z is PrfDz; 0 = 1 g and PrfD z; = 1 g. Without further assumptions this will not be su cient to identify PrfDz; 0 6 = Dz;g. To assure identi cation of PrfDz; 0 6 = Dz;g we use a monotonicity assumption.
Assumption 3 For any z 2 Z , either PrfDz; 0 Dz;g = 1 or PrfDz; 0 Dz;g = 1.
Under this assumption PrfDz; 0 6 = Dz;g = PrfDz; 0 = 1 g , PrfDz; = 1 g and thus PrfDz; 0 6 = Dz;g is identi ed. Imbensand Angrist 1994 exploit this type of condition in the context of identi cation of treatment e e c t s .
Corollary 3 Under Assumptions 1,2 and 3, c z; 0 ; is identi ed.
Identi cation of Marginal Treatment E ects
As we illustrate below, Assumption 2 is not likely to hold on all points in the support of Z. In this subsection we will establish conditions for identi cation of the marginal treatment e ects de ned above. We show that identi cation of the marginal treatment e ects can be carried out under support conditions that are weaker. Recall that the marginal treatment e ects are denoted m z;e ; and m c z;e ;, where the connection between 0 and is that 0 = + and that we consider the limit of to zero from above. The key assumption is the following:
Assumption 4 There exists z;e ; 0 such that Assumption 2 holds for all 0 that correspond to such that 0 z;e ;.
Under this assumption it is easy to show that the conditional marginal treatment e ects are identi ed.
Corollary 4 Under Assumptions 1 a n d 4, if m z;e ; exists, then it is identi ed.
Corollary 5 Under Assumptions 1,3 and 4, if m c z;e ; exists, then it is identi ed.
The argument here is in some sense the opposite of identi cation at in nity. In the typical identi cation at in nity we use the extremes of the distribution to produce the policy counterfactual. The corollaries above essentially use the part of the distribution that is in nitesimally close for identi cation. We will clarify this claim and discuss the extent to which these conditions are weaker in some of the examples below.
Examples
To demonstrate the ideas above and to examine some of the limitations of the approach w e study four examples. These have b e e n c hosen to represent a w i d e v ariety of models and policies. One parameter that is often discussed in the program evaluation literature is the e ect of the treatment on the treated." It can beidenti ed using an identi cation at in nity" argument. We will demonstrate that this result is a special case of Theorem 2 above. In our framework in which parameters are de ned conditioned on Z, this parameter takes the form,
It is interpreted as the e ect of the program on those individuals who choose to enter it. It can beconsidered a special case of our conditional policy e ect where the alternative policy 0 corresponds to elimination of the program, so that for any z 2 Z , Dz; 0 = 0 . In that case, c z; 0 ; = EY 0 , Y j Dz; 0 6 = Dz;
= ,E Y 1 z , Y 0 z jDz; = 1 :
Suppose that we have exclusion restrictions as in the case discussed above so that Z = Z 1 ; Z 2 where Z 1 in uences the decision to enter the program, but has no direct in uence on outcome conditional on entry. Following the logic above, since Dz; 0 = 0 with probability one, for each z 2 we need to nd a value of z 1 such that almost surely D z 1 ; z 2 ; = 0 . If we can nd such a z 1 , then with this type of exclusion restriction, Assumption 2 is satis ed. Thus for the treatment on treated parameter our identi cation conditions are met using identi cation at in nity."
This example is extreme in two w ays. On the one hand the conditions under which Assumption 2 w as satis ed required very little structure on the model. An exclusion restriction was su cient.
14 On the other hand the demands on the data are strong in the sense that for any z 2 Z , z; 0 ; is only identi ed by v alues of z for which the probability o f e n tering the program is zero. While for some small programs such a s g o vernment job training programs it may be possible to nd such a v ariable, but for larger programs" such as college, nding such a v ariable may be infeasible.
We observe that the problem associated with identi cation at in nity" is a special case of the problem of extrapolation in forecasting.
Example 2: Tuition Subsidy
In this example we consider the case of tuition subsidy which in uences an individual's decision to attend college. In particular we consider a policy in which a s t u d e n t r e c e i v es a tuition subsidy of level 0 if they choose to attend college. We assume that there is no such policy in existence today so = 0 , 15 and that we have data on tuition levels T faced by di erent individuals, and possibly other observables X. We also assume that tuition in uences an individual's decision about whether to attend college, but does not in uence earnings conditional on attending college.
14 Alternatively one could use linear index assumptions. . 15 Again we assume that this is a policy that only a ects a small number of people so there are no general equilibrium e ects.
An important assumption is that it is only the net tuition and not tuition and subsidy separately that a ects the college attendance decision. Thus Z = X;T and DZ; = DX;T , ;
The assumption that only the net tuition a ects the college attendance decision can be justi ed in the model where individuals do not distinguish the sources of funding and that the net tuition is known enough in advance so that the attendance decision can be made with enough preparation time. The e ect of a policy we measure under this assumption is that corresponds to the subsidy announced well in advance. More generally, the policywe can measure the e ect of correspond to whatever the equivalent v ariation we u s e .
We assume that the support of T does not depend on X and bounded, T`; T u . In this case the set Dz; 0 ; Z 0 x; t ; satis es the following: 16 Dz; 0 ; Z 0 x; t ; = x; t 2 Z j PrfDx; t = Dx; t , 0 g = 1 x; t 2 Z j t = t , 0 :
Clearly in this example any element o f fx; t 2 Z j t = t , 0 g is also an element o f Dz; 0 ; Z 1 x; t ; . If T u t T + 0 then T u t = t , 0 T, s o x; t is in the support of X;T which means that this set is not empty. Thus Assumption 2 will hold and z; 0 ; is identi ed. However if t T`+ 0 , then t = t , T`, so x; t is not in the support of X;T. In this case Assumption 2 is likely to fail and we can not identify z; 0 ; . Thus for some values of z, we can identify the policy e ect, but for others we can not. This means that we can only partially evaluate the policy, there will be a g r o u p of people for whom the e ect of the policy is not identi ed.
17
The intuition here is straight f o r w ard. If we h a ve an individual who faces tuition level $1500 with other covariates x, to identify the e ect of a $1000 tuition subsidy, we need to nd other individuals with the same covariates x, but who currently face a tuition level of $500. If the 16 Implicitly we assumed monotonicity of the decision with respect to tuition. If it is not, then Z0x; t ; 0 ; includes the right hand side. 17 Ichimura and Taber 1999 considers obtaining bounds for the impact in these cases.
minimal level of tuition in the data is $0 then we can nd such individuals, but if the minimal level is $1000 then the e ect of the policychange is not identi ed. In this case the policy e ect is not identi ed for individuals who face a current tuition between $1000 and $2000.
In contrast, Assumption 4 does not fail for any i n terior points of Z. For any i n terior point t if we c hoose e = t , T`, then when 1, t T + 0 = T`+ t , T`
so Assumption 4 will hold. Thus the marginal treatment e ects will be identi ed for all interior points of Z. This is the sense in which the conditions for estimating the marginal treatment e ects are weaker then the policy e ects. This case is somewhat special as tuition has two important r o l e s . First, it is the central focus of the policy in that changing tuition levels has exactly the same e ect on schooling attendance as changing the tuition subsidy. Second, it acts as an exclusion restriction in that it in uences the decision to attend college, but does not in uence earnings directly. The combination of these two c haracteristics allows us to put very little structure on the model but still be able to identify many of the policy e ects. While this structure is special, it is not unique. Many programs have either subsidies or eligibility criteria that vary across individuals which may beof interest and these subsidies and criteria typically will not have a direct e ect on outcomes.
Example 3: Linear Binary Choice Model Our two earlier examples are special in that we n e e d e d t o m a k e only very weak assumptions about the form of DZ;. Typically we will need to make stronger assumptions in order to verify Assumption 2. We often need an explicit structural model in which the parameters are policy invariant and need the model to predict how e n trance to the program depends on the structural parameters. This third example has more structure than in the previous case, but less than in our fourth example.
We assume that program participation is determined by linear index binary choice model for DZ;, DZ; = 1 Z 0 + U;
where Z = Z 1 ; Z 2 a n d Z 1 is an exclusion restriction that is independent o f Y 1 , b u t Z 2 need not be. We also assume that the relationship between a n d 0 i s w ell known in the sense that 0 i s i d e n ti ed from . In this case the key sets take the following form, where B is the level of welfare bene ts under the current w elfare system and X is observable factors.
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This woman searches for a new job. The probability of a job arriving in some time periodis X. When a job arrives, the wage is drawn from the distribution of wages FW; X. If the welfare mother chooses to accept the wage W she leaves welfare and receives utility, U L X;W : 19 We k eep the model simple by abstracting from unobservable heterogeneity.
Under di erent types of assumptions one could derive the reservation wage RX;B at which an individual is indi erent b e t ween working or not, where R increases with welfare bene ts.
If she receives at most one o er in a period,theprobability that a woman who is on welfare at the beginning of the period works at the end of the period is, PrWorking j X;u = X f1 , FRX;B; Xg :
Even abstracting from issues about unobservable heterogeneity there is a fundamental identication problem that Flinn and Heckman 1982 point out. If R is bounded from below, it is impossible to distinguish from 1,F below that point. In this case, and thus the full structural model are fundamentally unidenti ed. However, in some cases, one can still evaluate the e ects of policy changes.
In terms of our notation above, the observable variables are Z = X;B. The choice variable is welfare participation, the outcome is labor income, and the policy of interest is the welfare bene ts. Thus, D Z; denotes welfare participation under policy and,
We assume that X = X 1 ; X 2 and that X 1 a ects only the reservation wage and not the o ered wage distribution or the job o er probability. Suppose we w ant t o c hange welfare bene ts to some new level under new policy 0 . The key sets will have the following form, Dz; 0 ; = z 2 Z j PrfDz; 0 = Dz ; g = 1 = z 2 Z j Rx 1 ; x 2 ; B , 0 = Rx 1 ; x 2 ; B :
We are worried about the problem that reservation wages may bebounded from below. If the counter-factual reservation wage Rx; B 0 falls below this bound, then the set Dz; 0 ; will be empty and we will not be able to achieve identi cation. This case should depend on whether the policy under consideration expands bene ts or contracts them.
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If it cuts them back then RX;B 0 RX;B so for some values of Z we are likely to have problems, however if the proposed policy increases current b e n e t l e v el then RX;B 0 R X;B and we can still identify the impact of the policy even though we can not identify the full model. 20 It could be more complicated depending on the support of X.
Relationship with other approaches
The objective of this paper is to present a framework to consider direct estimation of policy impacts. However, since we carry this out in a binary choice framework our work can belinked directly to three strands in the literature of program evaluation. The rst strand is the sample selection approach t ypi ed by H e c kman and Robb 1985. The main criticism of this approach i s that it requires strong assumptions to obtain consistent estimation of the parameters of the model e.g. Lalonde, 1986 . We note that the typical parameters studied in the program evaluation literature are not necessarily the parameters we s t u d y . As we observed in Example 1, one of the parameters we examine includes the average treatment on the treated parameter studied in the literature as a special case. The condition we place for its identi cation, in this case, coincides with the standard condition to identify the average treatment on the treated parameter. In this sense our framework can be seen as a generalization of the identi cation result to allow di erent types of policies. A second strand is the instrumental variables or natural experiment approach t ypi ed by I mbens and Angrist 1994. The main criticism of this approach is that it either requires very strong assumptions or the coe cients do not converge to the policy relevant parameters of interest. 21 We d r a w on the natural experiment approach i n t wo w ays. First, we study the local e ects which are similar in form to the LATE" parameter de ned by I m bens and Angrist 1994. Second, we share the idea of exploiting the variation in the data that are most relevant for the variation we wish to examine.
Our framework extends the natural experiment framework by formally considering a policy parameter separately from the conditioning variables. This allows us to explicitly de ne the policy impact parameters ex-ante and then to discuss conditions for identi cation and estimation of such parameters. There are special cases in which t h e parameters we examine and the LATE parameter coincide which w e discuss in the empirical section below.
Another bene t of making the policy parameter explicitly di erent from the conditioning variable is that we can meaningfully de ne what we m e a n b y a policy equivalent v ariation and then make use of economic models to link variation in some variable with a policy under consideration.
A third strand is the matching method typi ed by Cochran and Rubin 1973 , Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983 , Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd1998, and Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd 1997 , 1998 . The main criticism of this approach is that the identi cation condition is generally not testable within its framework and that it is consistent with a model that allows selection on unobservable only under special cases.
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We d r a w on this approach b y p a ying closer attention to the distribution of observables than much of the previous literature. In some sense our approach is matching except that we use some aspect of an economic model to justify the match rather than the distance of the regressors typically employed in the literature.
To see this consider the tuition subsidy example. As the right hand side is identi ed in the data, the left hand side is. In this sense, the approach can be viewed as matching. When viewed in this manner our approach is also similar to Manski 1993. In our approach we show h o w the econometrician can study an individual who faces tuition t , 0 , to learn about the behavior of an individual who faces t if the policy is enacted. Manski models how agents study other individuals to learn about their own outcomes under alternative c hoices. 
Alternative Parameters
When the dimension of the linear space that includes Z z; 0 ; is high, we face the curse of dimensionality problem. There are two approaches established in the literature to deal with the curse of dimensionality. The rst is to average the pointwise estimates as is done in this subsection. The second is to exploit parametric restrictions researchers are willing to impose which w e discuss in the next subsection.
The averaging idea is to give up on estimating z; 0 ; o r c z; 0 ; and instead condition on a larger set of observables which can beestimated with smaller variance. For set S Z we generalize the notation so that Pr dZ; 0 6 = dZ; j Z 2 S The choice of set S is dictated by two considerations. The rst consideration is to de ne the group one is interested in studying. The second consideration is to de ne the subgroup of which one can expect to estimate the impact. For example, in order to estimate z; 0 ; , we need to beable to estimate both E Y Z ; jZ 2 Z z; 0 ; and E Y z; at the same time. This requires that the Lebesgue density o f z and Z z; 0 ; be bounded away from 0 at all points in S. 
Empirical Example

Methodology
In this section we estimate the impact of a tuition subsidy following the example above. We assume that in the current state of the world there is a tuition level T i in place for each individual i. A new tuition subsidy of the amount 0 is proposed while there is currently no subsidy = 0.
We t a k e this to be a state level or narrowly targeted subsidy to rule out general equilibrium e ects of the type discussed by H e c kman, Lochner, and Taber 1998. Our goal is to estimate the impact that this subsidy will have on earnings.
We measure this impact using the conditional parameter, where Z 0 is a subset of the support of the observables. We assume that Z is composed of tuition, T, and other conditioning variables, X. The key assumption is that expected earnings conditional on T ; X in the counter-factual world is equivalent to expected earnings conditioning on T 0 ; X in the current = 0 w orld where T 0 = T , 0 .
Consider estimation of the policy counter-factual E Y T ; X ; jT ; X 2 Z 0 . As in our We can then use the same method to estimate the counter-factual college attendance E D T ; X ; 0 jT ; X 2 Z 0 and combine the estimates to form the parameter. As we discussed, with a large number of covariates, the nonparametric strategy faces the curse of dimensionality problem. In particular, a high dimensional density function needs to be estimated for the case above. For this reason we consider a two dimensional index model as discussed above to obtain, E fY X;T;0 jX;Tg = P where T represents tuition, and X 1 and X 2 are composed variables in X that will typically have some elements in common. Note that we assume common in functions g 0 and g 1 .
This speci cation arises naturally in the standard selection model with additive error terms but that is not necessary to justify this speci cation. Under the standard additive error speci cation, one way of estimating the semiparametric model would be to rst estimate the entire model including the full joint distribution of u; " 1 and the joint distribution of u; " 2 , and then simulate the e ect. While many semiparametric estimators do a good job estimating the slope parameters, they often perform poorly when estimating the joint distribution of the error terms.
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Our approach is to estimate this parameter directly and avoid estimating the distribution of the error terms. In practice, often estimates of the distribution are represented by a low dimensional exible form. This faces the challenge of approximating the full distribution by a small number of parameters. It seems reasonable that they may do a poor job in estimating the relatively small part of the joint distribution that is relevant for the policy simulation. We a void this problem by essentially using only the part of the distribution that is relevant.
Under a maintained independence assumption there are a numberof di erent methods one could use. are identi ed which uses precisely the type of identi cation strategy we provide above. It typically does not require that the joint distribution of the error terms beglobally identi ed. The primary advantage of our estimator versus this one is that we do not rely on the additive independent error terms. We use it only for convenience.
To simplify the exposition we de ne T Z 0 + T X X 0 Y T ; X ; = Y X;Z;T; D T ; = D X;Z;T;
24 See for example Singer 1984 or Cameron and Taber 1996. Speci cally to estimate the parameter we use the following procedure: 25 See Ichimura 1993. 26 That is, we estimate by nding the minimizer of where for j = 0 ; 1;âj is obtained from a kernel regression of Yj , X 0 o n Z 0 . 27 Z 0 p i c ks up both the fact that we h a ve trimmed out some of the observations with low density a n d h a ve eliminated the values of the observables for which the parameter is not observable. In practice the parameter is identi ed for more than 99 percent of the sample. This is driven in large part by the index model we are using. If we relied solely on variation from the tuition data, the identi cation problem would be much more severe.
Comparison with Instrumental Variables
It may be useful to compare this estimator to instrumental variables before estimating the model. For the sake of exposition we consider a case in which there are no conditioning variables so we focus only on the exclusion restriction T. The simplest case is in which there is no heterogeneity in the treatment e ect so that for everyone in the population Y 1 , Y 0 = . In this case both estimators will yield consistent estimates of .
In the case in which there is heterogeneity in the treatment e ect, but tuition T, takes on only two values say t 1 and t 2 , where t 1 t 2 ;the IV method using tuition as an instrumental variable will converge to LATE as Imbensand Angrist 1994 have shown. In this case LATE can beinterpreted as the impact of the tuition subsidy policy of t 2 , t 1 which w ould be given to anyone facing t 2 originally. In this case LATE and c 0 ; w ould correspond exactly and the estimators would correspond exactly once we h a ve replaced the densities in the derivation above with probabilities.
The more realistic case in this example is where tuition takes on more than two v alues. Angrist, Graddy, and Imbens 1997 and use alternative formulations to interpret the probability l i m i t of the linear instrumental variables estimate in this type of case. For their application, Angrist, Graddy and Imbensshow t h a t i t i s a w eighted average of derivatives of the demand functions. Heckman and Vytlacil show that it is a weighted average of Local IV parameters. In both cases the weights are very hard to interpret making the estimate very hard to interpret. In contrast to IV, when it is identi ed our estimator produces a parameter that is easy to interpret.
As an example consider the tuition result where in the current world tuition T measured in thousands of dollars takes on J values S = t 1 ; :::; t J where t 1 t J , with marginal probabilities P 1 ; :::; P J . Assume for simplicity that these tuition values are equally spaced with . In this case there are a numberof di erent policy counter factuals we can identify. One is a thousand dollars subsidy to anyone who would pay tuition in the current s t a t e of the world except for the minimum tuition t 1 . LetS = S n f t 1 g. In this case our conditional parameter, Thus our policy parameter is a weighted average of something related to the LATE parameters and the weights are easily interpretable. For each tuition level the weight is the ratio of population a ected at that particular tuition level to the population a ected at some level of tuition. The key to the interpretability of the weights is the policy equivalent v ariation we i n troduced in this paper. The weight we would use is automatically adjusted appropriately when we de ne the policy of interest and its policy equivalent variation. Using this framework, at each level of tuition, we can hypothesize individuals choosing di erent s c hooling as they face two distinct policies. In the LATE framework, in order for individuals to choose di erent schooling, they need to face two distinct tuitions. Thus the LATE parameter needs to be de ned across two di erent tuition levels. When there are more than two potential outcomes, then, the weight takes a complicated form that is hard to make s e n s e . To see this we explicitly derive the weight for IV when there are more than 2 points in the support of the IV. We c a n s h o w that
k=1 E Y jT = t j , E Y jT = t k t j Pr T = t j P r T = t k P J j=1 P J k=1 Pr d = 1 jT = t j , Pr d = 1 jT = t k t j Pr T = t j P r T = t k = P J j=1 P k j E Y jT = t j , E Y jT = t k t j , t k P r T = t j P r T = t k P J j=1 P k j Pr d = 1 jT = t j , Pr d = 1 jT = t k t j , t k P r T = t j P r T = t k :
As But why w e should weight this way i s m uch more di cult to justify.
Results
We now turn to the empirical exercise of estimating the e ect of tuition subsidies on wages. We use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth using a speci cation very similar to Cameron and Taber 1999. 29 Our experimentation indicates that tuition has a weak e ect in the rst stage, so we use tuition as well as the presence of a four year college in the county as exclusion restrictions.
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In order to beconsistent with our model above we choose schooling to be a binary variable indicating whether the individual attended college. Thus in terms of the notation above, D i is an indicator of whether the student attended college, indexes di erent levels of tuition subsidies, and Y i is the log wage of individual i.
As we discussed, our tuition variable is measured by t h e a verage tuition of 2 year colleges in the state in which the individual lived at age 17. We need to assume that this variable and the unobservable in the choice equation are independent g i v en the conditioning variables. Because we expect the tuition variable to be correlated with some state characteristics which also can be correlated with the individual characteristics, we condition on ve b a c kground characteristics: race, parental education level, AFQT score, mean local income variables, and numberof siblings. In addition, as we expect shorter experience for college graduates at the same age, we also condition on experience.
An issue that arises here as in other applications is the choice of bandwidth for the density g. We used the following procedure: After estimating^ and^ we replace values for Y so that 28 We h a ve derived this estimator as a weighted average of all of the local average treatment e ects. Alternatively we could have derived it as a weighted average of the local-Late variabes, E Y 1 , Y 0 j Dtj 6 = Dtj+1 :This gives weights that are even harder to interpret at least for us. 29 Details about the data are provided there. 30 Kane and Rouse 1993 also use tuition as an exclusion restriction in estimating the returns to schooling, and Card1995 uses the presence of a college. Y 1 = 1 and Y 0 = 0 for all individuals in the sample. We rst choose a bandwidth for the rst dimension. We then experiment with alternative v alues of the bandwidth of the second dimension so that the estimator of b c Z 0 ; 0 ; on the simulated data is one. We have experimented with alternative values of the rst and second dimension around those points and nd that the results are not very sensitive to the bandwidth choices.
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The empirical results are presented in Tables 2 and 3 . It should be kept in mind that these parameters represent the e ect of attending college, not the return to a year of college. For comparison, in the rst row o f T a b l e 2 w e present the ordinary least square estimate of the returns to college and in the second we present the result from instrumental variables, instrumenting with tuition and with a dummy v ariable that indicates whether there is a college present in the county. We then estimate a selection model using a Heckman two step method and use that model to simulate the e ect of several levels of tuition subsidies.We nd that the selection results are lower than the OLS estimates, and that the IV estimates are higher. In results not reported, when we use tuition alone we nd that the IV estimates are much higher than OLS, while using presence of a college yields estimates of approximately 0.17.
In Table 3 we present the estimates of the policy simulations using the methodology outlined above. As one can see, these estimates are fairly close to the IV results particularly for the larger subsidies. The $100 yields a somewhat larger return of 0.410. These results suggest that students closer to the margin of whether to attend college have higher returns than others. There are a lot of caveats in interpreting these results. While most of these problems could be addressed, we v i e w this exercise as an example of what one could do using these methods, rather than as an empirical exercise unto itself. Thus, for the sake of brevity w e will refrain from a lengthy discussion of the many issues that arise.
Conclusions
When computational capacity is limited it is natural to construct and estimate a parsimonious model and then to use the result in many ways. The structural estimation approach shares this estimate once, use many times" approach but takes advantage of the increased computational capacity by making the model more realistic in many dimensions in the way it was not possible 31 Changing a bandwidth by a factor of 2 typically yields a change in the estimated e ect of approximately .02.
before. In this paper we discuss an alternative w ay t o t a k e a d v antage of increased computational capacity. Our approach is to construct and estimate a di erent model tuned for each of a particular parameter we wish to estimate. We discuss this approach in the context of measuring policy impacts.
We present a framework to directly estimate the impact of a new policy using a reduced form approach. We provide precise conditions under which the policy counter-factual can be estimated directly. This requires essentially three types of conditions. First, it requires some structure to be placed on the problem. Second, it requires an exclusion restriction. Third, it requires support conditions on the data.
Our results are applicable to ex-ante as well as ex-post policy analysis. To m a k e this point, we have considered estimation of a new policy e ect using data generated under old policy regime.
We also presented an estimator that uses these ideas and applied it to the study of tuition policy. In this case the estimator takes the form of a simple density ratio weighted average of the outcome variable. The empirical work nds estimates of the payo of tuition subsidies that are quite high and that smaller subsidies yield higher returns per individual.
When our goal is simply to estimate a policy impact, this approach improves over two stage methods that rst estimate a full structural model and then simulate the policy e ect for three reasons. First, there are cases in which the full model is not identi ed but the policy counterfactual can be identi ed. Second, we can often impose fewer assumptions and avoid spelling out preferences and the stochastic environment when they are not necessary for identi cation of the policy e ect. Third, estimation is focused on the range of the data that is most informative for estimating the policy counter-factual.
There are cases in which not all the policy impacts can beidenti ed using the approach we have presented in this paper but some policies impacts are. In this case we need to resort to a more structural or parametric approach for the policy impacts our approach can not identify. Using the policy impact parameters both approaches identify we can examine the speci cation assumptions behind the more structural approach.
We see a number of extensions of this work. First, the estimator proposed can be formalized and extended to other contexts. Second, we b e l i e v e the approach itself will prove useful in a wide range of empirical applications. For this purpose it will be useful to consider a decision framework where more than binary choice is involved. y Tuition is the average tuition of 2 year colleges of the state in which the individual lived at age 17 measured in thousands of 1986 dollars. z The rst stage uses Semiparametric Least Squares to estimate the e ects of these variables on college attendance. The second stage uses Semiparametric Least Squares to estimate a linear log wage equation model where the distribution of the error term is unspeci ed. The coe cients are restricted to be the same by college, but the conditional expectation of the error term di ers. x The sample size di ers because we h a ve longitudinal data on wages. 
